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I.

INTRODUCTION

“If Hispanics do not wish to be discriminated against because they
have been convicted of theft then, they should stop stealing.”1 This
alarming statement was made in 1989 by a Florida court in rejecting a
Title VII disparate impact claim involving the use of criminal records in
hiring decisions.2 It illustrates the difficulty facing plaintiffs who wish to
use federal anti-discrimination laws to challenge criminal records
policies that prevent them from finding adequate employment.
The employment prospects facing ex-offenders are bleak.3
According to a 2000 study, 60% of those released from prison were
unable to find employment within a year of their release.4 Some of this
is caused by characteristics apart from their criminal histories.5 Those
who have been incarcerated tend to have less education and work
experience, fewer cognitive skills, and greater instances of substance
abuse and other physical and mental health issues when compared with
the rest of the population.6
1. EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 723 F. Supp. 734, 753 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
2. Id. at 754.
3. Joan Petersilia, When Prisoners Return to the Community: Political, Economic, and
Social Consequences, SENT’G & CORRECTIONS (U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Washington, D.C.),
Nov. 2000, at 3.
4. Id.
5. Harry J. Holzer, Steven Raphael & Michael A. Stoll, Employment Barriers Facing
Ex-Offenders, 4–5 (Urban Institute Reentry Roundtable Discussion Paper, 2003).
6. Id. Holzer et al. note that approximately “70% of offenders and ex-offenders are
high school dropouts” and “about half are ‘functionally illiterate.’” Id. at 5 (quoting JEREMY
TRAVIS, AMY L. SOLOMON & MICHELLE WAUL, FROM PRISON TO HOME: THE
DIMENSIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF PRISONER REENTRY 12 (2001)) (citing AMY HIRSCH
ET AL., EVERY DOOR CLOSED: BARRIERS FACING PARENTS WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS 86
(2002)); Richard B. Freeman, Crime and the Employment of Disadvantaged Youths, in
URBAN LABOR MARKETS AND JOB OPPORTUNITY 201, 201 (George E. Peterson & Wayne
Vroman eds., 1992)). About three-fourths suffer from substance abuse problems. Holzer et
al., supra note 5, at 5.
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But beyond these factors, ex-offenders face the added burden of
discrimination that is based solely on their status as ex-offenders.7
While it may make sense for employers to prefer employees without
criminal records over ex-offenders,8 the result is a largely permanent
underclass of citizens who are unable to ever fully reintegrate into
society despite the fact that they have fulfilled the punishments meted
out to them by the criminal justice system.9 Given that nearly half of exoffenders are African-American and nearly one-fifth are Latino or
Asian,10 this underclass is largely made up of minorities.
Currently, there is no federal anti-discrimination law aimed at
protecting ex-offenders. However, because of the number of minorities
affected by such discrimination,11 efforts have been made to use the
disparate impact theory of discrimination available under Title VII as a
remedy. In this Article, I analyze both the effectiveness and desirability
of using disparate impact theory as a way to reduce employment
discrimination against ex-offenders. In particular, I argue that disparate
impact theory is neither the panacea nor the lost cause that some other
commentators have argued.12 Instead, I argue that there are particular
types of criminal-records-bar cases in which disparate impact theory
remains quite viable. However, I further argue that, outside of this
limited scope, pursuing such cases not only will result in predictable
failure for the individual case, but also risks de-legitimizing disparate
impact theory for those criminal records discrimination cases to which
the courts are amenable.
Part II of this Article provides an overview of the collateral
consequences of criminal convictions and particularly the burdensome
employment situation facing ex-offenders. Part III provides a brief
overview of disparate impact theory and discusses the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission’s new enforcement guidelines on
the use of arrest and conviction records in employment. Part IV
analyzes how disparate impact theory has been applied in cases in which
applicants were barred from employment or fired due to their criminal
7. See Holzer et al., supra note 5, at 11 (“Over 90% of employers surveyed are willing to
consider filling their most recent job vacancy with a welfare recipient, while only about 40%
are willing to consider doing so with an ex-offender.”).
8. Id.
9. See Freeman, supra note 6, at 201.
10. Holzer et al., supra note 5, at 5.
11. Id.
12. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
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records. In doing so, it counters one of the main critiques leveled at the
use of disparate impact theory in these cases, namely that the courts are
inherently hostile to them. Part V discusses and counters other critiques
that have been leveled against the use of disparate impact theory in
these cases. Finally, Part VI provides an evaluation of which categories
of cases are most likely to succeed and fail. I argue that, rather than
completely rejecting disparate impact theory in criminal records cases,
most courts have drawn boundaries that, while perhaps less forgiving
than advocates would like, leave open the possibility for challenging
specific types of criminal records policies. However, I also note some
risks associated with pursuing such cases. This Article concludes that
advocates should continue to pursue disparate impact challenges to
criminal records policies only in certain, well-defined categories of cases.
II. THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTIONS
A. Collateral Consequences Generally
Assisting those with criminal records to reintegrate into society has
been recognized as a major public policy problem in recent years.13
Contrary to the myth that once criminals “pay their debt to society”
they can start afresh, criminal records typically follow individuals
around for the rest of their lives, essentially ensuring that all but the
lucky few will remain on the margins of society.14 In an age in which
access to criminal records is cheap, easy, and widespread15 and the legal
13. See 150 CONG. REC. 1, 38 (2004). In his 2004 State of the Union Address, former
President George W. Bush announced the Prisoner Re-Entry Initiative noting, “America is
the land of the second chance—and when the gates of the prison open, the path ahead should
lead to a better life.” Id.
14. Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 593–94 (1960) (Warren, C.J., & Black, Douglas &
Brennan, JJ., dissenting) (“Conviction of a felony imposes a status upon a person which not
only makes him vulnerable to future sanctions through new civil disability statutes, but which
also seriously affects his reputation and economic opportunities.”); see also supra notes 8–9
and accompanying text.
15. Holzer et al., supra note 5, at 9 (“In its most recent review of state privacy and
security legislation, the U.S. Department of Justice concludes that criminal history record
information is increasingly becoming more available to non-criminal justice users, although
the degree of openness varies from state to state.”) (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF STATE PRIVACY AND SECURITY LEGISLATION:
1999 OVERVIEW 8–12 (2000)). Additionally, the use of criminal background checks by
employers is growing. In 1996, 51% of employers conducted criminal background checks.
Roberto Concepción, Jr., Need Not Apply: The Racial Disparate Impact of Pre-Employment
Criminal Background Checks, 19 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 231, 237 (2012). By 2010,
that percentage had risen to 92%. Id.
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system imposes countless restrictions on those with criminal pasts long
after they have “served their time,”16 the truth is that the slate is never
truly clean.
This is no small problem. Today, the United States has the highest
incarceration rate in the world.17 Estimates indicate that some 3.4% of
Americans will spend time in prison at some point in their lives.18
Approximately 19.8 million, or 8.6% of the adult population, have been
convicted of a felony,19 and each year, more than 650,000 prisoners are
released from penal institutions.20 But one need not have been
incarcerated to attain a black mark on his or her record. Indeed, a
staggering 65 million Americans, or over one in four adults, have a
criminal record of some kind.21
The consequences of a criminal conviction are, in many cases,
devastating.22 Beyond the stigma of having a criminal record, there are
a multitude of “collateral consequences”—those consequences and

16. See infra notes 22–26 and accompanying text.
17. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 6 (rev. ed. 2012). For every 100,000 people, approximately 750
are in prison. Id.
18. Sarah Shannon et al., Growth in the U.S. Ex-Felon and Ex-Prisoner Population,
1948 to 2010, at 11–12 (Apr. 1, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (presented at Population
Association of America 2011 Annual Meeting Program), available at http://paa2011.princeton
.edu/papers/111687, archived at http://perma.cc/WS8Y-8RCC.
19. Id. at 12.
20. Prisoners and Prisoner Re-Entry, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/arc
hive/fbci/progmenu_reentry.html, archived at http://perma.cc/SQ2N-NJKA.
Recent studies estimate more than 700,000 individuals annually leave the prisons of
our state and federal governments and return home. That is a little over 1,900 a day.
That is just over four times the number of people who made similar journeys from
prison to home a short twenty years ago.
Michael L. Foreman, Professor, Dir. of Civil Rights Appellate Clinic, Statement at EEOC
Meeting: Employment Discrimination Faced by Individuals with Arrest and Conviction
Records (Nov. 20, 2008).
21. MICHELLE NATIVIDAD RODRIGUEZ & MAURICE EMSELLEM, NAT’L EMP’T LAW
PROJECT, 65 MILLION “NEED NOT APPLY”: THE CASE FOR REFORMING CRIMINAL
BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR EMPLOYMENT 3 (2011), available at http://www.nelp.org/page//SCLP/2011/65_Million_Need_Not_Apply.pdf?nocdn=1, archived at http://perma.cc/GZ2HZBC2.
22. Lahny R. Silva, In Search of a Second Chance: Channeling BMW v. Gore and
Reconsidering Occupational Licensing Restrictions, 61 U. KAN. L. REV. 495, 499 (2012)
(“Today there are approximately 38,000 statutory and regulatory disqualifications triggered
solely by the fact of prior felony conviction. This amounts to an average of 700 per
jurisdiction, and it is estimated that 65% of these are employment related.” (footnote
omitted)).
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penalties a person faces beyond what is meted out as punishment for the
crime committed.23 Depending on the nature of the conviction, an exconvict may face restrictions in access to or be excluded all together
from a myriad of public benefits such as housing,24 social welfare
programs,25 and student loans.26 Such exclusions are also widespread in
private markets,27 and one might even face substantial difficulties on the
basis of mere arrests that did not result in convictions.28
B. Particular Employment Consequences
Perhaps the most devastating collateral consequence faced by those
with criminal records is lower levels of employment.29 In many cases,
employment discrimination against those with criminal records is not
only sanctioned but actually mandated by the state.30 For example,
several states prohibit ex-felons from all public employment.31 Many
also restrict certain ex-offenders from obtaining a wide variety of
occupational licenses.32

23. Margaret E. Finzen, Note, Systems of Oppression: The Collateral Consequences of
Incarceration and Their Effects on Black Communities, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y
299, 30507 (2005).
24. Heidi Lee Cain, Comment, Housing Our Criminals: Finding Housing for the ExOffender in the Twenty-First Century, 33 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 131, 137–38 (2003).
25. Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on
Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 158 (1999).
26. See 34 C.F.R. § 668.40 (1999)
27. See infra Part II.B.
28. See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
29. Alexandra Harwin, Title VII Challenges to Employment Discrimination Against
Minority Men with Criminal Records, 14 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 2, 2–3 (2012).
Prior to the current recession, between 25% and 40% of ex-offenders were unemployed. Id.
at 3.
30. Holzer et al., supra note 5, at 8.
31. Deborah N. Archer & Kele S. Williams, Making America “The Land of Second
Chances”: Restoring Socioeconomic Rights for Ex-Offenders, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 527, 536 (2006) (“Alabama, Delaware, Iowa, Mississippi, Rhode Island, and South
Carolina permanently deny convicted felons the right to public employment. The other fortyfive states ‘permit public employment of convicted felons in varying degrees.’” (footnote
omitted) (quoting Kathleen M. Olivares, Velmer S. Burton, Jr. & Francis T. Cullen, The
Collateral Consequences of a Felony Conviction: A National Study of State Legal Codes 10
Years Later, 60 FED. PROBATION 10, 13 (1996))).
32. Id. (“Some states also impose or allow restrictions on hiring or licensing exoffenders or parolees for particular professions (e.g., law, real estate, medicine, dentistry,
engineering, pharmacy, nursing, physical therapy, and education). Many states further
decrease ex-offenders’ employment prospects through occupational licensing laws that
contain character requirements that either bear no direct relation to the licensed occupation
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Even when discrimination is not mandated, ex-offenders face
daunting odds when looking for employment. Huge numbers of
employers conduct criminal background checks,33 and many have
expressed an unwillingness to hire employees with any sort of criminal
record.34 This is typically a record of convictions but could include a
record of arrests as well.35
According to one study, a criminal record reduces the likelihood of a
callback or employment offer by nearly 50%.36 Only a fraction of exoffenders are able to find jobs paying a living wage,37 and those who
have committed violent crimes may find it nearly impossible to find
work.38 The prospects of ex-offenders are only expected to get worse as
background checks become more ubiquitous.39
Employers often have good reasons for imposing these restrictions.
First, they may have legitimate reasons to be worried about liability.40
Next, some criminal convictions are so related to the job in question that
it would be bad policy to require employers to ignore them.41 A recent
or that do not consider the individual circumstances of the crime for which the applicant was
convicted.” (footnotes omitted)).
33. See Concepción, supra note 15, at 237.
34. Harry J. Holzer, Steven Raphael & Michael A. Stoll, Will Employers Hire
Ex-Offenders? Employer Preferences, Background Checks, and Their Determinants 7 (Inst.
For Research on Poverty, Discussion Paper No. 1243-02, 2002), available at http://www.irp.wis
c.edu/publications/dps/pdfs/dp124302.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/CP99-RCYE.
35. See, e.g., Clinkscale v. City of Phila., No. 97-2165, 1998 WL 372138 (E.D. Pa. June
16, 1998) (order granting summary judgment) (holding that a police department’s policy of
excluding applicants with any type of criminal history, including arrests without convictions,
did not violate Title VII); see also Archer & Williams, supra note 31, at 537 (“While some
may see the benefit of allowing employers to discriminate against convicted felons, it is
especially difficult to rationalize such discrimination on the basis of an arrest that did not even
result in a conviction. Yet, this happens in a majority of states: ‘Thirty-eight states permit all
employers (public and private) and occupational licensing agencies to inquire about and rely
upon arrests that did not result in a conviction.’ Arkansas, New Hampshire, and New Mexico
forbid public employers to rely on arrests that did not lead to conviction, but permit private
employers to do so.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Debbie A. Mukamal & Paul N. Samuels,
Statutory Limitations on Civil Rights of People with Criminal Records, 30 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1501, 1503–04 (2003))).
36. Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937, 955–56 (2003).
37. See Harwin, supra note 29, at 3; Petersilia, supra note 3, at 3–4.
38. Harwin, supra note 29 at 4 (“[O]ver ninety percent of employers turn away
applicants who report a history of violent crime.”).
39. Id. at 3.
40. See infra Part V.D (discussing negligent hiring liability).
41. Archer & Williams, supra note 31, at 536 (“Some employment restrictions are
grounded in concerns for public safety, and may therefore be appropriate. As one
commentator noted: ‘[I]t is clear why persons convicted of child molestation are not

838

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[98:831

study conducted by the Society for Human Resource Management
revealed several reasons employers cite for why they are hesitant to hire
ex-offenders.42 Those reasons include the following: a general worry
about having employees who are criminals, fear of liability for harm to
co-workers or customers, fear of financial liability through theft, and the
fact that a conviction is a general sign that the person in question lacks
skills or trustworthiness.43 Such concerns exist in spite of the fact that
there is no research indicating that a person’s criminal record, in and of
itself, is indicative of poor performance on the job.44 Although,
generally speaking, those who have committed a crime in the past have
a high risk of doing so in the future,45 such statements leave out such
factors as the role of unemployment itself in creating such recidivism
and the lessened risk with the passage of time.46 Indeed, studies show
that, over time, people with criminal records have the same risk of
committing further crimes as those with no records.47 When the fact that
permitted to work in day care centers.’” (quoting Marc Mauer, Introduction: The Collateral
Consequences of Imprisonment, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1491, 1493 (2003))). However,
Archer and Williams also discuss how some restrictions seem more retributive than anything
else. Id. at 536–37 (“A wide range of jobs include restrictions that bear no reasonable
relationship to the job function or a public safety concern. For example, depending on the
nature of the conviction, New York may deny ex-felons employment in more than one
hundred trades and professions, including barbering, plumbing, real estate, education, health
care, and private security. In Virginia, individuals convicted of a felony may not work as
nurses, funeral directors, pharmacists, optometrists, accountants, or dentists. And in
Maryland, state agencies and licensing boards have discretion to deny or revoke a wide range
of professional licenses, including those for barbers, insurance professionals, accountants,
landscape architects, plumbers, and social workers.” (footnotes omitted)).
42. SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGT., BACKGROUND CHECKING: CONDUCTING
CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS 7 (2010), available at http://www.shrm.org/research/surve
yfindings/articles/pages/backgroundcheckcriminalchecks.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/5M
4L-LN35.
43. See Harry J. Holzer, Collateral Costs: The Effects of Incarceration on the
Employment and Earnings of Young Workers 8 (Inst. for the Study of Labor (IZA),
Discussion Paper No. 3118, 2007); see also SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGT., supra note 42.
44. Stacy A. Hickox & Mark V. Roehling, Negative Credentials: Fair and Effective
Consideration of Criminal Records, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. 201, 201–08 (2013) (indicating that there
was “surprisingly little research” in this area and that the authors were able to identify only
one relevant study, which showed no link between having a criminal record at ages thirteen to
sixteen and engaging in negative work behaviors at age twenty-six).
45. See id. at 206. See generally Recidivism, BUREAU JUST. STAT., http://www.bjs.gov/in
dex.cfm?ty=tp&tid=17#data_collections (last visited Jan. 14, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc
/NME9-M446.
46. See Jocelyn Simonson, Rethinking “Rational Discrimination” Against Ex-Offenders,
13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 283, 284 (2006).
47. Hickox & Roehling, supra note 44, at 206; see Megan Kurlychek, Robert Brame &
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most crimes do not occur in the workplace is taken into account, the
risks are even lower.48
Given the role of unemployment in recidivism, such discrimination
has devastating consequences not only for ex-offenders but for society
as a whole.49 Offenders who are unable to obtain employment are far
more likely to engage in criminal behavior again.50 Furthermore, the
inability of ex-offenders to find work disproportionately affects black
and Hispanic men, who are represented in the prison population at
higher rates than any other group.51 Projections indicate that one-third
of black men and one-sixth of Hispanic men will be incarcerated during
their lifetimes52—arrests or convictions are even higher.53 Furthermore,
at least one study shows that a criminal record is more likely to prevent
African-Americans than whites from obtaining jobs.54
III. DISPARATE IMPACT CHALLENGES TO CRIMINAL RECORDS
EXCLUSION POLICIES
As stated previously, currently, there is no federal law directly
prohibiting employment discrimination against ex-offenders. However,
the disproportionate effect on certain minority groups indicates that
Title VII may be used to alleviate some of this discrimination.
Title VII provides two opportunities for challenging policies that bar
ex-offenders from employment: disparate treatment and disparate

Shawn D. Bushway, Scarlet Letters and Recidivism: Does an Old Criminal Record Predict
Future Offending?, 5 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 483, 493–94 (2006) (finding that eighteenyear-olds with conviction records were about as likely to be arrested as those without criminal
records after six to seven years without contact with the criminal justice system).
48. Hickox & Roehling, supra note 44, at 207.
49. See Simonson, supra note 46, at 284; see also Archer & Williams, supra note 31, at
530–31.
50. Simonson, supra note 46, at 284.
51. Id. Approximately two-thirds of inmates in the United States are African-American
or Latino. Id.
52. Harwin, supra note 29, at 4. In some communities, the rates are even higher. In
Washington, D.C., for example, the estimate is an astounding three-fourths of black men.
ALEXANDER, supra note 17, at 6–7.
53. Harwin, supra note 29, at 4.
54. Devah Pager, Double Jeopardy: Race, Crime, and Getting a Job, 2005 WIS. L. REV.
617, 644–645 (describing the results of a study in which black and white testers with equal
qualifications but varying criminal records applied for low-level jobs). “Among blacks
without criminal records, only 14% received callbacks relative to 34% of white noncriminals
(p<.01). In fact, even whites with criminal records received more favorable treatment (17%)
than blacks without criminal records (14%).” Id.
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impact.55 Disparate treatment claims allege that a member of a
protected class is being treated unfavorably as compared to others.56
Such a claim might be available if a plaintiff could prove that minority
ex-offenders were being treated differently than non-minority exoffenders.
In this Article, I focus on the other possible Title VII challenge—
disparate impact. Unlike disparate treatment claims, disparate impact
claims need not allege intentional discrimination; no discriminatory
purpose is required.57 Rather, a claim for disparate impact arises when a
facially neutral policy has a discriminatory effect.58 Once a plaintiff has
proven that the policy has a discriminatory effect, an employer has the
burden to show that the policy is “job related for the position in
question and consistent with business necessity.”59 The plaintiff may
then rebut this defense if he or she can show that another, less
discriminatory policy that is available to the employer would equally
fulfill the business necessity.60
Due to the disproportionately large number of ex-offenders who are
minorities,61 disparate impact theory provides an opportunity for
challenging policies that discriminate against ex-offenders in hiring and
retention. Although such policies are neutral on their face, in effect,
they operate to exclude far more minorities, particularly black and
Hispanic men, from employment opportunities.
A. The New EEOC Enforcement Guidelines
The EEOC has long recognized that discriminating against exoffenders disproportionately affects minorities.62 To that end, on April

55. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-3 (2012).
56. See id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
57. See id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
58. See id.
59. Id.
60. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii), (C).
61. See Holzer et al., supra note 5, at 5; see also Simonson, supra note 46, at 284.
62. For example, in a 1987 policy statement, the EEOC stated, “[T]he Commission’s
underlying position [is] that an employer’s policy or practice of excluding individuals from
employment on the basis of their conviction records has an adverse impact on Blacks and
Hispanics in light of statistics showing that they are convicted at a rate disproportionately
greater than their representation in the population.” U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N, EEOC POLICY STATEMENT ON THE ISSUE OF CONVICTION RECORDS UNDER
TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, AS AMENDED, 42 U.S.C. § 2000E ET SEQ.
(1982) (1987), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/convict1.html, archived at http://pe
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25, 2012, it issued new guidelines for employers on the use of arrest and
The guidelines
conviction records in employment decisions.63
consolidated and updated previous guidelines and call for an
individualized assessment of candidates with prior convictions.64 They
advise employers to consider, among other factors, the nature of the
crime committed, the time that has elapsed since the conviction, and the
nature of the job in question.65 The EEOC has since filed several
disparate impact lawsuits aimed at enforcing the guidelines.66
The EEOC guidelines have elicited strong negative reactions in
some corners.67 Critics have challenged the authority of the EEOC to
rma.cc/2FSF-8PNQ.
63. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE:
CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS
UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (2012) [hereinafter EEOC
GUIDELINES], available at http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/upload/arrest_conviction.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/LV2W-4KAK.
The EEOC’s new guidelines are a part of their “E-RACE” (Eradicating Racism and
Colorism from Employment) initiative. See The E-RACE Initiative, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/initiatives/e-race/ (last visited Jan. 17,
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/B5GH-RPEK. Among other things, that initiative targets
for stronger enforcement “facially neutral employment criteria” that are “significantly
disadvantaging applicants and employees on the basis of race and color.” Why Do We Need
E-Race?, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/initiatives/erace/why_e-race.cfm (last visited Jan. 17, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/LRA6-AY2P.
64. EEOC GUIDELINES, supra note 63, at 18–24.
65. Id. at 11. The complete list of factors is as follows:
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

The facts or circumstances surrounding the offense or conduct;
The number of offenses for which the individual was convicted;
Older age at the time of conviction, or release from prison;
Evidence that the individual performed the same type of work, post conviction,
with the same or a different employer, with no known incidents of criminal
conduct;
The length and consistency of employment history before and after the offense
or conduct;
Rehabilitation efforts, e.g., education/training;
Employment or character references and any other information regarding
fitness for the particular position; and
Whether the individual is bonded under a federal, state, or local bonding
program.

Id. at 18 (footnotes omitted).
66. On June 11, 2013, the EEOC filed suit against Dollar General Corporation and
BMW alleging that both company policies regarding criminal background checks caused a
disparate impact against African-Americans. See Complaint at 1–2, EEOC v. Dolgencorp,
LLC, No. 13-cv-04307 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 2013), ECF No. 1; Complaint, EEOC v. BMW Mfg.
Co. at 1, No. 13-cv-01583 (D.S.C. June 11, 2013), ECF No. 1.
67. See, e.g., Letter from Patrick Morrisey, W. Va. Attorney Gen., et al., to Jacqueline
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enforce the guidelines and the legitimacy of using disparate impact in
criminal-records-exclusion cases generally.68 While I will address those
critiques later in this Article, I first want to turn to critiques that, while
they support the underlying theory, question the wisdom or efficacy of
using disparate impact theory in these cases.
IV. CRITIQUES OF DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY —TREATMENT IN THE
COURTS
In spite of some early successes,69 many commentators have noted
the limits of Title VII in alleviating the problem of employment
discrimination against ex-offenders.70 Some of these critiques focus on
the fact that Title VII is not protective enough or is simply ill-suited to
the issue of ex-offender employment discrimination.71 They also point
out that because Title VII applies only to those in protected classes, it
excludes a large number of possible plaintiffs.72 Because ex-offenders
are not a protected class under Title VII, only those plaintiffs who are
also members of a protected class may bring suit.73
These are valid objections, and I address them, as well as others, in
more detail below. However, I will first address the most salient line of
critique, namely, that these cases, for a variety of reasons, have become

A. Berrien, Chair, EEOC, et al. 2 (July 24, 2013) [hereinafter Morrisey et al.], available at
https://dojmt.gov/wp-content/uploads/EEOC-Letter-Final.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/LZ
5L-HFRP (arguing that the EEOC’s new guidelines represent “gross federal overreach”); see
also, e.g., EEOC v. Freeman, 961 F. Supp. 2d 783, 803 (D. Md. 2013) (“By bringing actions of
this nature, the EEOC has placed many employers in the ‘Hobson’s choice’ of ignoring
criminal history and credit background, thus exposing themselves to potential liability for
criminal and fraudulent acts committed by employees, on the one hand, or incurring the
wrath of the EEOC for having utilized information deemed fundamental by most
employers.”); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, 11, 15, 17, Texas v.
EEOC, 2014 BL 232926 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (No. 13-cv-00255-C) (alleging that the new
guidelines interfere with state sovereignty).
68. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 67, at 16–17.
69. See, e.g., Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975) (Gibson, C.J.,
dissenting from Order Denying Petition for Rehearing En Banc); Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc.,
472 F.2d 631, 632 (9th Cir. 1972).
70. See Harwin, supra note 29, at 5 (calling the focus on disparate impact theory in this
context “misdirected”); Walker Newell, The Legacy of Nixon, Reagan, and Horton: How the
Tough on Crime Movement Enabled a New Regime of Race-Influenced Employment
Discrimination, 15 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 3, 27 (2013) (“Title VII is not a viable
mechanism for restricting criminal-record-related employment discrimination.”).
71. See Newell, supra note 70, at 27.
72. See infra Part V.C.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), (m) (2012).
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virtually unwinnable.
In making such arguments, some critics have argued that disparate
impact itself may be a dying doctrine.74 I do not dispute such claims
here but instead focus on whether, given what is left of disparate impact
theory generally, ex-offender cases are actually as unwinnable as some
critics have claimed.75
Given these parameters, the main critique levelled against using
disparate impact theory in the ex-offender context argues that the courts
have become hostile to such cases.76 Critics argue that the level of proof
courts require to prove a prima facie case have become untenable and
that, simultaneously, their requirements for establishing a legitimate
business necessity have lowered to the extent that the defense is nearly
impossible to overcome.77
There is certainly some evidence of hostility on the part of the
courts. In particular, the opinions in EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers
Corp.,78 and, much more recently, EEOC v. Freeman,79 both discussed in
further detail below, are dripping with sarcasm and a sense almost of
disbelief that the plaintiffs brought their suits.80 Still, a few isolated
cases do not evidence a general trend. In fact, a closer look at cases
even in which plaintiffs have lost shows not so much a hostility toward
the use of disparate impact in criminal records cases as a natural desire
to balance the problem of employment discrimination against exoffenders with the very real need of employers to have freedom in

74. See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a
Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 138
(2003); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach
to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1231 (1995);
Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1344 (2010); Amy
L. Wax, Disparate Impact Realism, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 621, 624–25 (2011). For an
overview of a variety of critiques that have been leveled against disparate impact theory, see
Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 911, 968–84 (2005).
75. See, e.g., Michael Connett, Comment, Employer Discrimination Against Individuals
with a Criminal Record: The Unfulfilled Role of State Fair Employment Agencies, 83 TEMP. L.
REV. 1007, 1031–32 (2011); Linda Lye, Comment, Title VII’s Tangled Tale: The Erosion and
Confusion of Disparate Impact and the Business Necessity Defense, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 315, 318 (1998); Simonson, supra note 46, at 286.
76. See Connett, supra note 75, at 1031–32; Lye, supra note 75, at 344–47.
77. Lye, supra note 75, at 344–47.
78. 723 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Fla 1989).
79. 961 F. Supp. 2d 783 (D. Md. 2013).
80. See id.; Carolina Freight, 723 F. Supp. 734.
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determining who will make the best employees and to avoid liability for
choosing the wrong ones.81 To more clearly understand what is going
on, it is necessary to take a closer look at some of the cases that have
analyzed this issue in detail.
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the use of criminal
records exclusions. However, two cases in which it touched on the issue
peripherally prove instructive when examining how other courts have
addressed the issue.
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,82 the Court held that an
employer’s refusal to rehire an employee who had engaged in illegal
activity against the employer was not a violation of Title VII.83
However, in doing so, the Court specifically noted that McDonnell
Douglas was not excluding the plaintiff “through some sweeping
disqualification of all those with any past record of unlawful behavior,
however remote, insubstantial, or unrelated to applicant’s personal
qualifications as an employee.”84 The latter caveat seems to imply that
such a sweeping qualification would be suspect.
In New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer,85 the Court upheld a
transportation agency’s policy of refusing to hire anyone who was
currently using methadone, a drug used to treat addiction to illegal
drugs, especially heroin.86 In that case, the Court relied on the “safety
sensitive” nature of the positions and held, without a great deal of
analysis, that the policy served the “legitimate employment goals of
safety and efficiency.”87 Beazer indicates a willingness to grant
employers greater deference in their business necessity defenses when
the business necessity at issue is public safety.88
As will be shown, these two principles—a suspicion of overly broad
exclusionary policies and deference to public safety concerns—color, to
a greater or lesser extent, nearly all criminal-records-exclusion cases.
When the employer can reasonably assert a business necessity related to
public safety, the employer will virtually always win, regardless of how
81. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973); El v. Se. Pa.
Transp. Auth. (SEPTA), 479 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2007).
82. 411 U.S. 792.
83. See id. at 804–07.
84. Id. at 806.
85. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
86. Id. at 573, 594.
87. Id. at 587 n.31.
88. See id. at 592.
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broad the exclusion is.89 Without the public safety assertion, broad
exclusionary policies will often, although not always, fall.90 The murkier
cases, and the ones most likely to show evidence of hostility, are those
that fall somewhere in between: narrower policies that do not involve
public safety.91
In this section, I illustrate examples of each of these types of cases in
turn. I treat the last case that I discuss, El v. Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transportation Authority (SEPTA),92 separately because, as will be
shown, that case signals a possible step away from the current paradigm
and offers a glimmer of hope for how disparate impact theory might be
used to offer broader protection to minority men with criminal
records.93
A. Broad Exclusionary Policies
Given the EEOC’s particular distaste for broad exclusionary policies
as well as the oft-stated principle that Title VII protects individuals, not
classes, employers who maintain such policies without also offering a
compelling public safety justification would seem the most vulnerable to
attack.94 Nonetheless, while several important cases indicate that, as a
general rule, this is true, there are some exceptions.
1. Green v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.
Green v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. (MoPac)95 probably remains
the most important case to have held that criminal records exclusionary
policies have a disparate impact on minority men.96 Indeed, the
EEOC’s enforcement guidelines rely heavily on the reasoning and
principles enunciated in Green.97
In Green, the court held that MoPac’s policy of denying employment
to anyone who had been convicted of any crime other than a minor
traffic offense had a disparate impact on minorities.98 Green was a black
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.C.
479 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2007).
See infra Part IV.D.
See El, 479 F.3d at 243.
523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 1298–99.
EEOC GUIDELINES, supra note 63, at 17–18.
Green, 523 F.2d at 1298–99.
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male who had been convicted in 1967 for refusing military induction, for
which he served twenty-one months in prison.99 He disclosed his prior
conviction when he applied for a position as a clerk with MoPac in
1970.100
The court found that from September 1, 1971, through November 7,
1973, 3,282 blacks and 5,206 whites had applied for positions at
MoPac.101 Of these applicants, 174 blacks, or 5.3%, were rejected due to
conviction records compared to 118 whites, or 2.23%.102 The court
found that this was enough to show a prima facie case of disparate
impact.103
The court then held that MoPac did not meet the requirements of
the business necessity test.104 MoPac offered the following justifications:
“1) [F]ear of cargo theft, 2) handling company funds, 3) bonding
qualifications, 4) possible impeachment of an employee as a witness, 5)
possible liability for hiring persons with known violent tendencies, 6)
employment disruption caused by recidivism, and 7) alleged lack of
moral character of persons with convictions.”105 The court rejected
these justifications because MoPac did not empirically validate them or
show that “a less restrictive alternative with a lesser racial impact would
not serve as well.”106 The court found that, while MoPac’s proffered
justifications were relevant, they did not justify an absolute bar.107
In explaining its holding, the Green court noted that it interpreted
the Supreme Court’s qualification in McDonnell Douglas that the
plaintiff in that case could be fairly barred because he had engaged in
illegal activity directly aimed at his employer “to suggest that a sweeping
disqualification for employment resting solely on past behavior can
violate Title VII where that employment practice has a disproportionate
racial impact and rests upon a tenuous or insubstantial basis.”108 In
probably its most powerful statement against the use of broad
exclusionary policies, the court stated:
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 1292–93.
Id. at 1292.
Id. at 1294.
Id.
Id. at 1295.
Id. at 1298.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1296.
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We cannot conceive of any business necessity that would
automatically place every individual convicted of any offense,
except a minor traffic offense, in the permanent ranks of the
unemployed. This is particularly true for blacks who have
suffered and still suffer from the burdens of discrimination in our
society. To deny job opportunities to these individuals because
of some conduct which may be remote in time or does not
significantly bear upon the particular job requirements is an
unnecessarily harsh and unjust burden.109
Importantly, in discussing a prior district court case, the court
seemed to endorse some tailoring measures that would allow employers
to bar certain ex-offenders without running afoul of Title VII.110 In
particular, the court discussed the desirability of examining the nature
and seriousness of prior crimes, as well as their relationship to the job in
question; the time that has elapsed since the conviction; the
circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime; and the
criminal’s degree of rehabilitation.111 These factors form the basis for
the EEOC’s guidelines in providing individualized consideration of
given applicants.112
2. Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc.
Although Green is considered the seminal case on the application of
disparate impact theory to the use of criminal records exclusionary
policies, the earliest example at the appellate level in which a court
addressed the racially discriminatory effects of such policies occurred a
few years earlier in Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc.113 In Gregory, the
Ninth Circuit upheld the United States District Court for the Central
District of California’s decision that a bright-line rule barring those with
arrest records from employment violated Title VII.114 In its opinion, the
Ninth Circuit noted that the district court had “correctly anticipated the
subsequent decision” in Griggs115 “[i]n deciding that statistics
demonstrated the racially discriminatory character” of Litton’s criminal

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 1298.
Id. at 1297 (citing Butts v. Nichols, 381 F. Supp. 573, 578–81 (S.D. Iowa 1974)).
Id. at 1297.
EEOC GUIDELINES, supra note 63, at 18.
472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 632.
Id. (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)).
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records policy.116
Earl Gregory had been denied employment as a sheet-metal worker
by Litton Systems because he had been arrested fourteen times.117
Litton required each applicant to reveal his or her arrest record on an
employment questionnaire.118 The Ninth Circuit upheld the district
court’s finding “that the apparently racially-neutral questionnaire
actually operated to bar employment to black applicants in far greater
proportion than to white applicants.”119 The Ninth Circuit further
upheld the district court’s finding that Litton had presented no
legitimate business necessity for inquiring into the arrest records of
prospective employees.120
While the Ninth Circuit’s opinion is relatively short, the district
court’s opinion provides more information about the underlying
rationale for the decision. That court noted that “[t]here is no evidence
to support a claim that persons who have suffered no criminal
convictions but have been arrested on a number of occasions can be
expected, when employed, to perform less efficiently or less honestly
than other employees.”121 The district court found that AfricanAmericans are arrested at higher rates than whites, so policies barring
employment to those with arrest records have a disparate impact on
African-Americans.122
Importantly, the court did not discuss Litton’s claimed business
necessity for the policy123 but instead stated simply that the
discrimination was “not excused or justified by any business
necessity.”124 The court did note, however, that “[t]he decision to
withdraw the offer of employment was in no way predicated on any
national security clearance regulations,”125 indicating that such national
security concerns, if sufficiently job-related, could have justified the
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401, 402 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
122. Id. at 403.
123. This may be explained by the fact that the district court’s opinion was handed
down prior to Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), which is the seminal disparate
impact case. Thus, the burden-shifting framework in disparate impact cases would not have
been established at the time of the district court’s decision.
124. Gregory, 316 F. Supp. at 403.
125. Id. at 402.
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policy. This is an important caveat to the Litton decision because it
foreshadows later courts’ easy acceptance of proffered business
necessities in situations that involve public safety.126
3. Waldon v. Cincinnati Public Schools
A major triumph for those who support the use of disparate impact
theory in criminal records cases occurred just last year in Waldon v.
Cincinnati Public Schools.127 In this case, the State of Ohio had enacted
legislation in 2007 requiring “criminal background checks of current
school employees, even those whose duties did not involve the care,
custody, or control of children.”128 Employees convicted of certain
crimes were to be terminated, regardless of the time period passed since
the conviction or the relationship to the employee’s present
qualifications.129
In 2008, Gregory Waldon and Eartha Britton, both AfricanAmerican, were fired pursuant to the new law.130 The defendant had
fired ten employees; nine were African-American.131 Waldon and
Britton filed suit, and the school district filed a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim.132 The school district argued that it was merely
complying with a state mandate, which was a business necessity.133 The
plaintiffs argued that Title VII “trump[ed] state law.”134
The court found that there was “no question that the Plaintiff’s ha[d]
adequately plead a case of disparate impact.”135 Importantly, the court
also rejected the defendant’s argument that Title VII only trumped state
laws that had a discriminatory intent.136 The court said that the case was
a “close call” and noted that if it had been based on “serious recent
crimes,” the policy would likely be valid due to the “employees’
proximity to children.”137 However, the court found in this case that the

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See infra Part IV.B.
941 F. Supp. 2d 884 (S.D. Ohio 2013).
Id. at 886.
Id.
Id. at 886 & n.1.
Id. at 886.
Id.
Id. at 887.
Id.
Id. at 888.
Id.
Id. at 889.
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plaintiffs’ “offenses were remote in time,” that Britton’s was
“insubstantial,” and that “both had demonstrated decades of good
performance.”138
The Waldon case is important in showing the promise of disparate
impact theory in criminal records cases in a number of respects. First,
the court accepted, virtually without question, that criminal records bans
have a disparate impact on African-Americans.139 Second, the court
rejected a business necessity defense that seemed particularly strong—
the upholding of state law—reaffirming that Title VII trumps state
law.140 Finally, although the business necessity proffered in this case was
not public safety but compliance with state law, the court’s willingness to
overturn a criminal records ban in a case that involves jobs with
“proximity to children” indicates a skepticism towards claims of business
necessity that rely on general claims about “safety” when the crimes in
question are remote in time.141 This latter rejection is particularly
important given the amorphous nature of safety claims and the difficulty
of disproving them.
4. Williams v. Carson Pirie Scott
Williams v. Carson Pirie Scott142 provides an example of a case in
which a broad exclusion, here a policy excluding ex-felons from
employment, was upheld even when the job in question had no public
safety element.143 Williams was fired from his job as a collector with
Carson Pirie Scott after disclosing that he was an ex-felon.144 The court
assumed that Carson Pirie Scott’s policy had a disparate impact but said
the “purpose of minimizing the perceived risk of employee dishonesty”
was legitimate.145 In fact, the court performed very little analysis of
Carson Pirie Scott’s justification, noting, “[T]here is no basis whatever
for drawing a rational inference that the absence of a felony record is
138. Id. Waldon had been found guilty of felonious assault in 1977 and served two
years in prison. Id. at 886 n.1. He had worked for the school district for just under thirty
years at the time of termination. Id. Britton had been convicted of “acting as a go-between
in the purchase and sale of $5.00 of marijuana” in 1983. Id. She had worked for the school
district for eighteen years at the time of termination. Id.
139. Id. at 888.
140. Id. at 888–90.
141. See id. at 888–90.
142. No. 92 C 5747, 1992 WL 229849 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 1992).
143. See id. at *2.
144. Id. at *1.
145. Id. at *2.
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not ‘job related for the position in question and consistent with business
necessity.’”146
Carson Pirie Scott may not be a particularly instructive case in terms
of its legal analysis because of its heavy reliance on the business
necessity issue as it was laid down in Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio,147 which was abrogated on this point by the Civil Rights Act of
1991.148 Although the case was decided after this abrogation, the court
questioned whether the Civil Rights Act of 1991 applied because the
hiring practice had been adopted under Wards Cove.149 While the court
also stated that it would hold the same even if the Civil Rights Act of
1991 applied,150 its almost unquestioning acceptance of the defendant’s
proffered business justification as well as the closeness in time of the
case to the adoption of the Act makes it unlikely that it was really
conducting a thorough analysis of that issue. In fact, the court simply
stated, “[B]oth intuitively and as a matter of law it is obvious that an
employment policy that bars the hiring of ex-felons—at least for a job as
‘collector,’ the position for which Williams applied and was originally
hired—does not violate Title VII.”151
Nonetheless, this case does provide some instruction on the issue of
whether courts are inherently hostile to criminal records exclusionary
policy claims. In a footnote, the court said:
This Court has long shared the view that one major tool in the
effort to reduce recidivism is the provision of employment
opportunities for the ex-offender seeking to return to society. . . .
But neither Title VII nor any other provision of positive law
authorizes this Court to impose its own notions of sound policy
on employers on pain of their being subjected to liability in case
of their noncompliance with such notions.152

146. Id. at *2–3.
147. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). The Court in Wards Cove had substantially lightened the
burden on employers seeking to assert business necessity defenses. See id. at 659. Under
Wards Cove, the employer had only a burden of production, rather than persuasion, and
needed only to show that a given practice had a substantial justification rather than being
“essential” or “indispensable” to the business. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
148. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (1991)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012)).
149. Williams, No. 92 C 5747, 1992 WL 229849, at *3.
150. Id.
151. Id. at *1.
152. Id. at *3 n.3.
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This footnote indicates not hostility but a genuine, if perhaps overly
generous in this case, concern for maintaining independence in business
judgments.
B. Public Safety as a Business Necessity
The three cases discussed in this section illustrate how easy it is for
employers to win cases when they can reasonably proffer a business
necessity defense that is based in public safety. As may be expected, the
employers in each of these cases represent quintessential public safety
employers: police and fire departments.
1. Clinkscale v. City of Philadelphia
Clinkscale v. City of Philadelphia153 represents a case in which a
broad criminal records exclusionary policy operated in a particularly
unfair manner and yet was accepted due to a public safety business
justification.154
The plaintiff in Clinkscale was an African-American male and an
employee of the FBI who sought a position as a police officer with the
Philadelphia Police Department.155 At the time of his application, he
had two prior arrests on his record, the first for assaulting a neighbor
and the second for assaulting a police officer.156 The charges regarding
the neighbor were dismissed, and Clinkscale was acquitted on the
charges regarding the police officer.157 In fact, he had filed a lawsuit
against the police department over the latter charges, and the city had
settled with the plaintiff.158 His record was expunged.159
Clinkscale argued that the police department’s policy of denying
applicants to the police academy on the basis of prior arrests had a
disparate impact on African-Americans.160 However, the court held that
the department’s policy was justified, even in light of the fact that the
plaintiff was likely innocent of his prior charges.161 The court noted that,
in other cases, dropped charges may not be the result of innocence and
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

No. 97-2165, 1998 WL 372138 (E.D. Pa. June 16, 1998).
Id. at *3.
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *1–2.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. at *3.
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further opined that “[e]ven an unjustified arrest may be indicative of
character traits that would be undesirable in a police officer, such as a
quick temper, poor attitude or argumentativeness.”162 The court
rejected other cases that the plaintiff offered to support his view that
broad exclusionary policies violate Title VII specifically because none of
those cases involved the position of police officer.163
2. Foxworth v. Pennsylvania State Police
A more recent police department case, Foxworth v. Pennsylvania
State Police,164 was also decided in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
and the court applied the same reasoning as in Clinkscale. Foxworth
addressed the Pennsylvania State Police’s “automatic disqualification
factors” for the hiring of police cadets.165 At the time of Foxworth’s
application, a cadet applicant could be disqualified for past criminal
behavior, regardless of whether the applicant had been arrested, if that
behavior could have been charged as a “Misdemeanor–1 or higher.”166
Foxworth, an African-American male, had committed a theft a few
years prior to his application that was later expunged through an
Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition.167 Foxworth’s record would
have been grounds for automatic disqualification, and he argued that
this policy had a disparate impact on African-Americans.168 The court
questioned whether Foxworth’s statistics adequately showed that the
particular policy had a disparate racial impact but stated that, even if
they did, the policy was justified as “ensuring both public safety and that
police officers do not disregard, nor are perceived as disregarding, the
law.”169
3. Tye v. City of Cincinnati
Another case that accepted a business necessity of “public safety”
with very little analysis was Tye v. City of Cincinnati.170 In that case, a
fire department used hiring practices that, among other things, included
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at *3.
Id.
402 F. Supp. 2d 523 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
Id. at 528.
Id.
Id. at 527–28.
Id. at 534.
Id. at 534–36.
794 F. Supp. 824 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
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a criminal background check.171 Five black applicants applied to be fire
recruits with the Cincinnati Fire Division during the 1985–1987 hiring
season and were denied.172 During that same period, the background
check eliminated 60% of black applicants and 30% of white
applicants.173
The court found that the background checks had a disparate impact
on minorities but accepted the fire department’s proffered business
necessity—public safety.174 In fact, the court specifically noted that “a
public employer hiring a firefighter is held to a lighter burden in
demonstrating that its employment criteria is job-related, because of the
potential risk to public safety of hiring incompetent firefighters.”175
While it is important to note that this case employed the lower burden
on employers enunciated in Wards Cove,176 the court’s direct statement
that employers ought to be held to a lighter burden when questions of
public safety are in play is further evidence that employers who can
reasonably assert a business necessity centered in public safety will have
an easier time winning these types of cases.177
C. Evidence of Hostility
The cases that seem to provide evidence of actual hostility on the
part of the courts toward the use of disparate impact theory in criminal
records exclusionary cases are those in which the employer has
implemented some measures to tailor their exclusionary policy to the
job in question, regardless of whether public safety is implicated.178 This
makes sense. If the hostility arises from a general sense that it is unfair
to require employers to hire people with criminal histories just because
they are members of a protected class, such concerns will be most
171. Id. at 827–28.
172. Id. at 826.
173. Id. at 829.
174. Id. at 833.
175. Id.
176. Id. The court, citing Wards Cove, noted that only the burden of production, but
not of persuasion, shifts to the employer once the employee has made a prima facie case. Id.
(citing Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989)). The court did not
discuss why it used the Wards Cove standard even though the case was decided after the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 had been enacted, abrogating Wards Cove on this point. Presumably, this
was because the Wards Cove standard was still in place when the suit was first filed.
177. See Tye, 794 F. Supp. at 833.
178. See, e.g., EEOC v. Freeman, 961 F. Supp. 2d 783 (D. Md. 2013); EEOC v. Carolina
Freight Carriers Corp., 723 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Fla. 1989). See also infra Part IV.C.
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apparent in cases in which the employer has already made some effort
to ensure that the exclusions are job-related. While not every case that
is decided in favor of the employer under these circumstances shows
evidence of hostility,179 because the sense of hostility is one of the main
critiques of the use of disparate impact theory,180 I focus in this section
on two cases that do not seem to hide the disdain that some judges feel
toward the implementation of this theory in this context.
1. EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp.
The opinion in EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp.,181 the case
quoted at the start of this Article, provides an example of undeniable
hostility to the use of disparate impact theory in criminal records
exclusionary cases. Carolina Freight had a prior-criminal-records policy
which, among other things, barred employment for anyone convicted of
a felony, theft, or larceny that resulted in a prison or jail sentence.182
Francisco Rios, a Hispanic man, had two prior convictions: one from
1968 for receiving stolen property, which resulted in a sentence of
probation, and the second in 1969 for felony larceny, which resulted in a
sentence of twenty-four to sixty months in prison, of which he served
eighteen.183 In 1980, he began working as a “casual truck driver” for
Carolina Freight; he had disclosed his prior convictions during a
polygraph at that time.184
Rios had a good record while employed with Carolina Freight.185 In
1983, he was put up for consideration for a promotion to regular
employee at the company’s Fort Lauderdale terminal.186 Casual
employees did all of the same work as regular employees but did not

179. See, e.g., Hill v. U.S. Postal Serv., 522 F. Supp. 1283, 1302–03 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(holding that the plaintiffs did not make out a prima facie case of disparate impact because
they failed to isolate a particular employment practice that caused a disparity); see also, e.g.,
Fletcher v. Berkowitz Oliver Williams Shaw & Eisenbrandt, LLP, 537 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1031
(W.D. Mo. 2008) (upholding an employee’s termination for a prior rape conviction that was
justified based on concerns about co-worker morale). While both of these cases were decided
in favor of the defendant, neither case indicated any particular hostility to the use of disparate
impact theory in criminal records cases.
180. See supra notes 76–80 and accompanying text.
181. 723 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
182. Id. at 737–38.
183. Id. at 737.
184. Id. at 738–39.
185. Id. at 739.
186. Id. at 740.
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have certain fringe benefits and were not guaranteed a forty-hour work
week.187 On his application for promotion, Rios did not indicate his
prior convictions.188 In updating his personnel file for promotion, a
Carolina Freight employee discovered the first polygraph test revealing
the convictions and decided he was disqualified for the regular position
due to his prior convictions.189 Rios’s supervisor put him up for the
position again in 1984, and he was again rejected.190 There was no
evidence in the record indicating that anyone hired for the regular
positions did not meet the conviction policy standards.191 Rios filed a
discrimination suit and was subsequently fired.192
The EEOC filed suit on behalf of Rios challenging the portion of
Carolina Freight’s policy barring from employment anyone with a
felony, larceny, or theft conviction that resulted in an active prison or
jail sentence.193 As evidence, the EEOC submitted a labor market
analysis and a report showing that Hispanics were more likely than
whites to have been sentenced to prison terms.194
The court did find that Hispanics are convicted of theft at higher
rates than whites and that conviction policies like the one at issue in
Carolina Freight therefore adversely impact Hispanics.195 However, the
court found that the EEOC failed to prove there was a significant
imbalance at the Fort Lauderdale terminal or that any alleged
imbalance was caused by the policy, noting that the EEOC failed to
adequately define the relevant labor market.196 The court also said that
the EEOC should have examined “applicant flow data,”197 even though
it acknowledged earlier that such data was unavailable.198
Relying on the later-abrogated Wards Cove,199 the court said that
187. Id.
188. Id. at 740–41.
189. Id. at 741.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 741–42.
193. Id. at 742.
194. Id. at 742–46.
195. Id. at 751.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 742.
199. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), superseded by statute,
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074 (1991), as recognized in WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
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Carolina Freight’s purported business necessity—to reduce employee
theft—was sufficient because it “serves, in a significant way, the
legitimate employment goals of the employer.”200 More telling, the
court opined that the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Green,201 which could
be read to bar all conviction policies, was “ill founded,” stating that
“[t]he plaintiff’s position that minorities should be held to lower
standards is an insult to millions of honest Hispanics.”202 In a
particularly sarcastic aside, the court said that “[a]lthough [it] rejoices
along with the angels of God for every sinner that repents, to say that an
applicant’s honest character is irrelevant to an employer’s hiring
decision is ludicrous.”203 Instead, an employer may refuse to hire exfelons even though it has a disparate impact on minorities because “[t]o
hold otherwise is to stigmatize minorities by saying, in effect, your group
is not as honest as other groups.”204
The EEOC asserted that a time limit on conviction consideration
would be a less discriminatory alternative.205 However, because they did
not offer evidence to prove that this would be equally effective or have
less of an impact on Hispanic truck drivers, the court did not accept this
rebuttal.206 The court also found the policy adequate because it only
barred “applicants who are convicted of a theft crime involving an active
prison sentence,” and that “[e]mployees are not penalized for mere
arrests or commission of non-theft felonies.”207 The court ended its
discussion on the disparate impact issue noting that that even if the
disparate impact argument were true, “the lesson is not to lower the
employer’s standards, but to raise the qualifications of Hispanics
applying for jobs.”208
In short, the Carolina Freight court expressed what could be read as
annoyance at the very idea that the policy in question could not be
justified by business necessity. Furthermore, it did so under the guise of
protecting minorities, showing a particular concern that challenges to

200. Carolina Freight, 723 F. Supp. at 752 (quoting Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
201. Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975).
202. Carolina Freight, 723 F. Supp. at 752.
203. Id. at 752–53.
204. Id. at 753.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. (emphasis in original).
208. Id. at 754.

858

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[98:831

such policies based on their racially discriminatory impact denigrates
other members of the minority group.
2. EEOC v. Freeman
Another example of hostility, in at least some courts, to disparate
impact cases based on criminal records exclusion policies can be found
in a very recent case in the federal district court in Maryland, EEOC v.
Freeman.209 In Freeman, the EEOC challenged the defendant’s creditcheck policy as having a disparate impact on African-Americans and its
criminal background check policy as having a disparate impact on
African-Americans and males.210 Although the court ultimately granted
summary judgment on the basis of inadequate statistics,211 the court’s
hostility to the very nature of the claim was evident from the opening
paragraph of the opinion. The opinion opens with commentary on the
virtues of criminal history and credit record background checks and
notes that the reasons for such checks are “obvious.”212
The court’s hostility to the EEOC as a body is also evident from the
outset. In an unusual aside, the court noted that “[t]he present case is
only one of a series of actions recently brought by the EEOC against
employers who rely on criminal background and/or credit history checks
in making hiring decisions.”213 The court also seems to be accusing the
EEOC of hypocrisy, noting that “even the EEOC conducts criminal
background investigations as a condition of employment for all
employees, and conducts credit background checks on approximately 90
percent of its positions.”214
The opinion’s attacks on the EEOC’s expert witness in the case
seem particularly uncouth. At various times, words and phrases used to
describe the expert, his results, and his methods include the following:
“an egregious example of scientific dishonesty,”215 “mind-boggling
number of errors,”216 and “laughable.”217 He is portrayed as a bumbling
fool, with unnecessary asides such as “[a]mazingly, despite his claims of
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

961 F. Supp. 2d 783 (D. Md. 2013).
Id. at 786, 789.
Id. at 786–87, 799.
Id. at 785.
Id. at 786.
Id.
Id. at 795.
Id. at 796.
Id.
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doing so”218 and “[f]inally, [the expert] once again managed to introduce
fresh errors into his new analysis.”219 The court seems to stop just short
of calling the man stupid. Conversely, Freeman is described as a
“family-owned company” (albeit one “with annual revenues exceeding
$1.3 billion”) whose policies are rational and legitimate.220
Finally, the opinion ends with a warning to employers. The court
states,
Indeed, any rational employer in the United States should
pause to consider the implications of actions of this nature
brought based upon such inadequate data. By bringing actions
of this nature, the EEOC has placed many employers in the
“Hobson’s choice” of ignoring criminal history and credit
background, thus exposing themselves to potential liability for
criminal and fraudulent acts committed by employees, on the
one hand, or incurring the wrath of the EEOC for having utilized
information deemed fundamental by most employers.221
The court reiterated the need for tailored, reliable statistics and then
said, “To require less, would be to condemn the use of common sense,
and this is simply not what the discrimination laws of this country
require.”222
D. Promising Steps: El v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation
Authority
While Green remains the seminal case on the use of disparate impact
theory to challenge criminal records exclusion policies,223 a more recent
case, El v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority,224 may
prove more influential in the coming years. A close reading of the case
indicates that it could actually herald a new era of holding employers to
a higher standard in asserting their business necessity defenses.225

218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See id. at 785, 787.
221. Id. at 803.
222. Id.
223. Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975).
224. 479 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2007).
225. Hickox & Roehling, supra note 44, at 255 (“[T]he El court comes closer than some
previous decisions in requiring that employers establish the relevance of applicants’ criminal
histories.”).
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Indeed, the EEOC’s new guidelines can be viewed in part as a response
to what it viewed as a request for clarification from the El court.226
In El, the plaintiff, Douglas El, had been hired by King Paratransit
Services, Inc., a sub-contractor of SEPTA, to drive a bus providing
transportation services to people with mental and physical disabilities.227
A criminal background check turned up that El had a forty-year-old
conviction for second-degree murder, which had occurred when El was
fifteen years old and for which he had served three-and-a-half years.228
Although El had disclosed the conviction at the time of his application,
King had not noticed it until receiving the results of El’s criminal
background check.229 At that time, King terminated El’s employment.230
At the time of El’s hiring, SEPTA had a policy barring employment
for anyone convicted of driving under the influence, of a felony or
misdemeanor for a crime of moral turpitude, or of a violent crime.231
SEPTA also barred employment for other offenses if they had occurred
within the seven years prior to employment.232 El argued that SEPTA’s
policy had a disparate impact on black and Hispanic applicants because
they are more likely to have criminal records than white applicants.233
While ultimately deciding in favor of the employer, the El court
made a number of important observations in its holding that indicate an
openness to these types of cases. First, it noted that an employer’s
proffered “business necessity” defense requires some level of empirical
proof, rather than mere “‘common-sense’-based assertions.”234 This
signals a discomfort with the near-automatic credence given to
employers asserting safety concerns in some other cases. Next, the court
also reaffirmed that “more is better” justifications—e.g., the idea that, if
a given quality was necessary to the performance of a job, then a policy
purporting to select employees who have “more” of that quality is
legitimate—did not meet the standards of the business necessity
defense.235 This is important because it calls into question the notion
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

EEOC GUIDELINES, supra note 63, at 11–12.
El, 479 F.3d at 235.
Id. at 235–36.
Id. at 235 n.2.
Id. at 235.
Id. at 236.
Id.
Id. at 236–37.
Id. at 240.
Id.
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that employers can over-exclude those with some type of criminal
history based solely on the idea that those without criminal histories will
generally present the least amount of risk, regardless of whether a given
applicant’s criminal history bears any cognizable relationship to the job
in question.
The El court also noted an important distinction between the hiring
criteria used in Griggs and other disparate impact cases and the hiring
criteria at issue when criminal records are considered.236 The court
noted that in most cases, the hiring criteria at issue is alleged to measure
an applicant’s actual ability to perform the job in question.237 However,
in criminal records cases, the policy is not meant to measure one’s
ability to perform the job; indeed, no one alleged that El’s prior
convictions made him unable to drive a bus safely or effectively.238
Rather, the policy measures “risk,” in this case, whether applicants with
criminal histories are more likely to pose a risk to the passengers they
are transporting.239 The court noted that the standard it typically applies
in test-score cases—whether the policy measures “minimum
qualifications necessary for successful performance of the job in
question”—was “awkward” in the criminal records context because “it
is hard to articulate the minimum qualification for posing a low risk of
attacking someone.”240
The El court also distinguished Green, noting that, in that case, the
job in question was an office job and “did not require the employee to
be alone with and in close proximity to vulnerable members of
society.”241 It also noted that the policy in Green was a broad ban on
hiring those with criminal records regardless of how relevant the
conviction was, whereas the policy at issue in El was more narrowly
tailored to prevent an employer from hiring only “those that it argues
have the highest and most unpredictable rates of recidivism and thus
present the greatest danger to its passengers.”242

236. Compare id. at 240–43, with Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 427–29
(1971).
237. El, 479 F.3d at 242.
238. Id. at 242–243.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 243 (quoting Lanning v. Se. Pa. Trans. Auth., 181 F.3d 478, 481 (3d Cir. 1999)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
241. Compare id., with Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290, 1292–93 (8th Cir.
1975).
242. Compare El, 479 F.3d at 243, with Green, 523 F.2d at 1298.
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Given the lack of on-point authority, the El court applied its own
standard from prior cases, holding that policies must “accurately
distinguish between applicants that pose an unacceptable level of risk
and those that do not.”243 Rejecting El’s contention that all bright-line
policies were prohibited, the court held that “[i]f a bright-line policy can
distinguish between individual applicants that do and do not pose an
unacceptable level of risk, then such a policy is consistent with business
necessity.”244 While this may seem to lean against plaintiffs, given other
courts’ leniency in public safety cases, the fact that the El court
attempted to create a standard at all in such cases indicates a desire to
put at least a little more onus on the employer in defending such
policies.
In El, SEPTA argued that its policy was consistent with business
necessity because
(1) the job of a paratransit driver requires that the driver be in
very close contact with passengers, (2) the job requires that the
driver often be alone with passengers, (3) paratransit passengers
are vulnerable because they typically have physical and/or
mental disabilities, (4) disabled people are disproportionately
targeted by sexual and violent criminals, (5) violent criminals
recidivate at a high rate, (6) it is impossible to predict with a
reasonable degree of accuracy which criminals will recidivate, (7)
someone with a conviction for a violent crime is more likely than
someone without one to commit a future violent crime
irrespective of how remote in time the conviction is, and (8)
SEPTA’s policy is the most accurate way to screen out applicants
who present an unacceptable risk.245
The court noted that a bright-line policy could be justified if SEPTA
could show that someone with a violent conviction would always pose a
“materially higher risk” than someone without.246 It noted that to prove
this, SEPTA could show that “other factors—such as age at conviction,
the number of violent convictions, and/or the remoteness of that
conviction—are unreliable or otherwise fail to reduce the risk to an
acceptable level.”247 By putting this burden on the employer, El

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

El, 479 F.3d at 245.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 245–46.
Id. at 246.
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indicates that such factors should be tied directly into the business
necessity defense as opposed to being shouldered by the plaintiff in an
attempt to prove that there is a less discriminatory alternative that the
employer could have adopted.
The court ultimately relied on SEPTA’s presentation of expert
testimony that, regardless of the passage of time, someone with a prior
conviction for a violent crime will never be “less or equally likely” to
commit a violent act than someone who had never done so.248 The court
noted that, because the plaintiff had presented no evidence to rebut this
testimony, it must “take [the expert] at his word.”249 Another SEPTAprovided expert testified that the mentally and physically disabled are
more likely than other groups to be the victims of violent or sexual
crime and that “employees of transportation providers commit a
disproportionate share of those crimes against disabled people.”250 The
court noted that El’s decision not to depose the experts or to present
conflicting expert testimony ultimately proved “fatal” to his case.251
Thus, in spite of the fact that the court ultimately held in favor of the
employer, the El court indicated no hostility toward the use of disparate
impact theory to challenge criminal records policies. Instead, the court
presented a thoughtful and balanced analysis of the issue and attempted
to move some of the burden back on the employer.252 The main
difficulty remaining for plaintiffs after El is the difficulty of obtaining
the type of statistical evidence that could help to rebut employers’
proffered business necessities.253 This is a problem faced by disparate
impact plaintiffs generally, but it does present particular challenges to
employees in criminal-records-exclusion cases due to the lack of onpoint research showing the likelihood or lack thereof that someone who
committed a crime in the past will do so again and, in particular, will do
so on the job. Nonetheless, the El court’s assertion that the employer
bears the burden of showing that more-tailored policies would not work
as well may indicate some measure of relief for plaintiffs.254

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 247.
Id.
Id. at 248.
See id. at 247.
See id. at 240, 249.
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V. OTHER CRITIQUES OF DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY
While the most salient critique of the use of disparate impact
theory in criminal records cases is that courts are hostile to these types
of claims, it is important to look at other critiques that have been leveled
as well. These critiques come from both sides of the spectrum, those
that indicate concern for the plaintiffs and those that indicate concern
for the defendants.255 Nonetheless, regardless of motivation, the
critiques share many overlapping themes. In this section, I address four
main criticisms of the uses of disparate impact theory in criminal records
cases.
A. Creating a New Protected Class
Some critics have argued that using disparate impact theory to
protect those with criminal convictions essentially amounts to creating a
new protected class.256 Indeed, this critique was made as early as the
dissent in Green.257 The dissent in that case noted, “In effect, the
present case has judicially created a new Title VII protected class—
persons with conviction records. This extension, if wise, is a legislative
responsibility and should not be done under the guise of racial
discrimination.”258
The obvious response to this critique is that it could be made of
virtually every use of disparate impact theory. By its very nature,
disparate impact protects only a subset of individuals within a protected
class: women under a certain height or weight,259 for example, or
African-Americans who do not have high school diplomas.260 To state
that applying disparate impact theory in the context of criminal
convictions is to protect only those African-American and Hispanic men
who have criminal records is to state the obvious.

255. See supra note 70.
256. Morrisey et al., supra note 67, at 4 (accusing the EEOC of creating a new protected
class of former criminals “under the pretext of preventing racial discrimination”).
257. Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290, 1300 (8th Cir. 1975) (Gibson, C.J.,
dissenting from Order Denying Petition for Rehearing En Banc).
258. Id.
259. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 (1977) (holding that a prison’s
minimum height and weight restrictions for prison guards violated Title VII because of the
restrictions’ disparate impact on women).
260. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (holding that a facially neutral
policy requiring employees for certain positions to have high school diplomas and pass
intelligence tests violated Title VII because of its disparate impact on African-Americans).
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Nonetheless, there does seem to be something qualitatively different
about the application of disparate impact theory to those with criminal
records versus, say, those who fail to perform well on a test. This
difference was noted by the court in El v. SEPTA in its discussion of the
business necessity defense to disparate impact.261 The court pointed out
that the typical assessment of the business necessity defense involves
evaluating whether a given policy or practice is related enough to the
ability to perform the job at hand to justify its disparate impact.262 While
this is rarely a simple process, there is often at least an element of
measurability in making the determination. For example, there are
extensive testing validation requirements that make it easier to
determine if a given test truly measures job performance. 263
In contrast, typical business necessities proffered in criminal
convictions cases rest on general concerns for hard-to-measure qualities
like safety,264 loss prevention,265 and employee morale.266 Such qualities
are hard to measure with any accuracy. While there are some studies
indicating that former criminals are no more likely to commit further
crimes than those without criminal histories, such studies are sparse.267
On the other hand, studies indicating the opposite may also not be
useful because they do not account for the key question: Whether those
with prior criminal histories are more likely to commit further crimes at
work.268 General figures on recidivism are not useful in this context
because they fail to account for the fact that one of the chief causes of
recidivism is a lack of employment opportunity.269 Therefore, business
necessity arguments that rest on general recidivism figures simply beg
the question; the very propensity that is used to prevent people from
obtaining employment would likely be alleviated if the individual could

261. El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 242–45 (3d Cir. 2007).
262. Id. at 242.
263. See generally 29 C.F.R. pt. 1607 (2014)
264. See, e.g., El, 479 F.3d at 242–43; see also supra Part IV.D.
265. See, e.g., EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 723 F. Supp. 734, 754 (S.D. Fla.
1989); see also supra Part IV.C.1.
266. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Berkowitz Oliver Williams Shaw & Eisenbrandt, LLP, 537 F.
Supp. 2d 1028, 1031 (W.D. Mo. 2008); see also supra note 179.
267. See, e.g., Kurlychek et al., supra note 47.
268. Hickox & Roehling, supra note 44, at 207 (“There is surprisingly little research
examining the relationship between a criminal record and the propensity to commit
workplace crimes or engage in inappropriate workplace behavior.”).
269. See Simonson, supra note 46, at 284; see also Archer & Williams, supra note 31, at
52930.
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obtain employment.
To navigate these murky waters, it may be best to turn to the
original purpose of both Title VII and disparate impact theory. Two
key lines of thought help to clarify this matter. First, Title VII aims to
eradicate employment discrimination via two avenues: equal
opportunity and equal effects.270 Disparate impact theory arose out of
the idea that simply opening doors was not enough.271 Instead, to have
teeth, employment discrimination law also needed to address
employment practices that, while seemingly opening doors, in essence
provided keys to only part of the population.272 There was a general
recognition that dispensing with facially discriminatory policies and
practices would mean little if neutral practices simply operated to
perpetuate the same results.273
The other key line of thought underlying Title VII that bears a
particularly close relationship to the development of disparate impact
theory is that Title VII is ultimately aimed at protecting individuals not
classes. This focus on individuals has been reiterated time and again in
Title VII cases.274 In spite of the fact that disparate impact theory seems
to inherently protect based on group status, there is the same underlying
current of individual protection that can be found in disparate treatment
cases.275 Both theories rest on the notion that individuals ought not to
be stereotyped based on their membership in a protected class.276 The
key difference seems to be that, while disparate treatment often shows a
particular concern for those who do not possess the stereotyped
characteristic,277 disparate impact offers protection for those who
270. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971) (“The objective of
Congress in the enactment of Title VII . . . was to achieve equality of employment
opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable
group of white employees over other employees.”).
271. See id.; Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 645–46 (1989).
272. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429–30.
273. Id.
274. See, e.g., City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 705, 707–
08 (1978) (holding that an employer’s pension plan that required women to make larger
contributions than men based on actuarial data that women tend to live longer and thus
receive greater benefits from the pension plan violated Title VII because, while women as a
class live longer than men, this may not be true for individual women).
275. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
276. See Simonson, supra note 46, at 284–87.
277. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250 (holding that adverse employment
actions predicated on stereotypes about the appropriate behavior of women amounts to sex
discrimination).
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actually possess it.278 Therefore, it protects individuals precisely because
they share commonalities with others in their class by asking whether
these commonalities are reasonable bars to particular employment
opportunities.
These twin purposes of Title VII and disparate impact theory help to
put the “creating a new protected class” argument in context. On their
face, criminal records policies do not seem to interfere with either equal
opportunity or equal effects in their traditional sense because the
characteristic that is being screened for is one that the person possessing
the characteristic voluntarily took on.279 However, once one commits a
crime, that record stays with the person forever, so a criminal history
essentially becomes an immutable characteristic as unsheddable as one’s
race.280 That being the case, the purpose of Title VII to protect
individuals takes on new dimensions. Given this context, like in other
disparate impact cases, individual members of protected classes must be
given individual consideration precisely because they share a given trait
in addition to their membership in the protected class.
Protecting individuals because of a trait that they share with a
number of members of their protected class does not, then, create a new
protected class based on the trait. Instead, individuals gain protection
since they share that trait precisely because they are a member of the
protected class. The sense that a new protected class is being created
results from the fact that not all members of the protected class share
the trait. Nonetheless, this is true of virtually all disparate impact
278. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 451–52 (1982) (rejecting the “bottomline” defense to disparate impact, which asserted that a practice with disparate impact on a
protected group should be allowed so long as an employer took later remedial efforts to
eradicate the disparity, because such a defense fails to fully protect those individuals who are
screened out by the practice).
279. See Miriam J. Aukerman, The Somewhat Suspect Class: Towards a Constitutional
Framework for Evaluating Occupational Restrictions Affecting People with Criminal Records,
7 J.L. SOC’Y 18, 59 (2005) (noting that “[u]nderlying much of the Court’s equal protection
analysis is a concern that people should not be penalized for characteristics that they did not
choose and cannot change” and distinguishing the former from the latter using the related
concept of “accountability”). While the same could be said of religion and pregnancy, the
only other protected statuses in Title VII that can unquestionably be seen as matters of
personal choice, it is well-established that the extremely personal nature of religious choices
and the choice to become a parent make them more akin to in-born characteristics like race
and sex than to other types of personal choices.
280. Id. at 63 (arguing that those with criminal records share many characteristics with
other protected classes under the Equal Protection Clause and noting that unless reforms
such as the expanded use of expungement are implemented, “criminal records will remain
largely immutable”).
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cases.281 If all members of a protected class shared the trait, then there
would be no need for disparate impact because such cases would
amount to facially discriminatory policies that would be covered by
disparate treatment.282
B. Risk of Validating Negative Stereotypes
While the analysis in the previous section defeats the argument that
the EEOC is attempting to create a new protected class of those with
criminal convictions, it brings up another concern. Saying that
individuals gain protection since they share a trait precisely because of
their membership in a protected class sounds innocuous when one is
discussing, say, women under a certain height.283 It is decidedly more
problematic when stating that African-American and Hispanic men
have more criminal convictions precisely because they are AfricanAmerican and Hispanic.
It is well established that minority men, particularly AfricanAmerican men, suffer from multiple stereotypes associated with both
their race and sex.284 Studies show that there is a strong and prevalent
association of African-American men with criminality.285 Indeed, at
least one scholar has argued that measures aimed at protecting AfricanAmerican men with criminal records may have a negative effect on
African-Americans without criminal records; the idea is that if
employers cannot screen based on criminal records, then they may
screen for proxies of criminality, and given the association of AfricanAmerican men with criminality, such unconscious bias will result in
more African-American men without criminal records being screened
from employment.286

281. See supra notes 259–60 and accompanying text.
282. See supra note 274.
283. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 (1977) (holding that a prison’s
minimum height and weight restrictions for prison guards violated Title VII because of the
restrictions’ disparate impact on women).
284. See David S. Cohen, No Boy Left Behind? Single-Sex Education and the Essentialist
Myth of Masculinity, 84 IND. L.J. 135, 174 (2009) (“African-American males have been
viewed as oversexed, dangerous, and threatening.”).
285. Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Valerie J. Purdie, Phillip Atiba Goff & Paul G. Davies,
Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876,
876 (2004).
286. Michael A. Stoll, Ex-Offenders, Criminal Background Checks, and Racial
Consequences in the Labor Market, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 381, 406 (arguing that more
limited use of criminal background checks could result in greater discrimination against non-
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Nonetheless, when one takes a step back from the employment
context, it is clear that the association of minority men with criminality
has severe effects on that community that do not begin with the
rejection from employment opportunities. Such an association is very
likely both a cause and an effect of the disproportionate number of
African-American and Hispanic men who are involved in the criminal
justice system.287 The association may be a factor in causing the
disproportionality by affecting both the types of laws that are
implemented and, more importantly, how they are enforced.288 In other
words, the disproportionate number of African-American and Hispanic
men who have encounters with the criminal justice system is very likely
at least partially caused by preexisting biases about their propensity to
commit crime.289 They are both more likely to be arrested and more
likely to be convicted, regardless of the severity of the crime.290 Once
this occurs, the disproportionate numbers then reinforce the stereotype
that African-American men and Hispanic men are more likely to
engage in criminal activity.
Thus, “protecting” African-American men and Hispanic men who
do not have criminal records seems like a hollow reason for rejecting the
protection of those who do. It takes attention away from the inequities
in the criminal justice system and, indeed, implies that there are no
inequities. The underlying implication is that the criminal justice system
offenders “who are members of social groups that are disproportionately represented by exoffenders, such as African Americans”).
287. See, e.g., Jacqueline Johnson, Mass Incarceration: A Contemporary Mechanism of
Racialization in the United States, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 301, 317 (2011–2012) (“Incarceration
containerizes, legitimizes, and grounds perceptions associating race with criminality.”);
Tracey L. Meares, Social Organization and Drug Law Enforcement, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
191, 218 (1998) (“[T]he stereotyping of African Americans as criminals affects how law
enforcement agents relate to African Americans and how African Americans in turn relate to
them.”); Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or Why the
“War on Drugs” was a “War on Blacks”, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 381, 381 (2002)
(“Throughout the drug war, African Americans have been disproportionately investigated,
detained, searched, arrested and charged with the use, possession and sale of illegal drugs.”).
288. See Meares, supra note 287, at 218 (discussing the racialized nature of drug laws
and enforcement).
289. See Simonson, supra note 46, at 284–85.
290. Michael Pinard, Criminal Records, Race and Redemption, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL’Y 963, 967–68 (2013) (“From encounters with law enforcement officers on our
nation’s streets, roads and highways, to arrest, to charging decisions (including youth charged
as adults) to sentencing and to incarceration, poor African-Americans and Latinos are
disproportionately injected into the criminal justice system and remain stuck in it.” (footnotes
omitted)).
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acts as a fair measure of who is “deserving” and “not deserving” of
protection. Whether it is the job of employment discrimination law to
attempt to rectify these inequities is an important but separate question.
Although the prevailing attitude is that employment discrimination law
is not the proper venue for addressing societal discrimination,291 it is
nonetheless true that in many instances it operates to do just that.
Griggs itself relied heavily on the fact that African-American men had
been victims of a poor education system that caused them to
underperform on intelligence tests.292 Thus, from the start, disparate
impact theory has, at least to some extent, attempted to alleviate the
effects of societal discrimination, whatever the disclaimers that have
since been promulgated.
Furthermore, as a philosophical matter, justifying the negative
treatment of one “less deserving” segment of a group by reference to
the possible consequences to the “more deserving” segment is a
dangerous game. Such arguments may rest, even if not explicitly, on the
assumption that discrimination against a certain group is inevitable and,
that being the case, that it is better to protect at least part of the group
than to protect the group as a whole.293 Furthermore, it operates to
justify such discrimination by insinuating that the underlying cause of
the discrimination, when not motivated by animus, is justified. This can
be seen in arguments against affirmative action that rely on the negative
connotations that attach to all members of the affected group regardless
of whether they were beneficiaries.294 For example, in the education
context, focusing on the negative perceptions that may attach to
members of the group who would have been admitted to a given school
regardless of affirmative action programs may imply that the system of
291. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of
Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 40 (2006) (arguing that an approach to
discrimination law that accounts for, among other things, unconscious bias “may be asking
antidiscrimination law to do too much of the work of responding to society’s inequalities”);
Tristin K. Green, A Structural Approach as Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locating Employer
Wrong, 60 VAND. L. REV. 849, 851 (2007) (“Current pessimism concerning the political
viability of a structural approach [to employment discrimination law] . . . stems from the
assumption that a structural approach aims to impose costs on employers for societal barriers
to employment.”).
292. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
293. See, e.g., Morrisey et al., supra note 67, at 3–4.
294. Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations After
Affirmative Action, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 1251, 1263 (1998) (discussing arguments against
affirmative action that center around the idea “that using racial or gender preferences
reinforces negative stereotypes about minorities and women”).
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admissions that happens to benefit this group is inherently fair and
unbiased.
Additionally, even if one accepts the premise, and it is not hard to
accept, that minority men without criminal records may face unintended
negative consequences from the attempt to protect those with criminal
records, this may open up a new door of liability—disparate treatment.
Indeed, one of the arguments the attorneys general made in their letter
attacking the EEOC is that more individualized assessment of
candidates for employment could lead to increases in disparate
treatment lawsuits.295 The idea is that if employees are evaluated on an
individual basis, unconscious bias against minority men will be more
likely to play out in “forgiving” Caucasian men with criminal records
while continuing to discriminate against minority men with criminal
records.296 This may very well be true, but if this is the case, it may
provide minority men with criminal records with an extra avenue of
protection. Currently, it is particularly difficult to prove disparate
treatment cases when criminal records are involved because it is difficult
to find an appropriate comparator.297 With individualized consideration,
minority men with criminal records should be better able to pinpoint
when Caucasian men with similar negatives on their resume are
provided with opportunities that they are denied.
C. Underinclusive
Another critique levied at the use of disparate impact theory to
protect minority men with criminal records is that such a use is
underinclusive.298 This critique is valid precisely because the critique
that such policies create a new protected class is not. Title VII disparate
impact theory will, in most instances, protect only minority men and, in
particular, African-American and Hispanic men.299 This is because—
precisely because there are a disproportionate number of African-

295. See Morrisey et al., supra note 67, at 3–4; see also Stoll, supra note 286, at 406.
296. See Stoll, supra note 286, at 406.
297. See Harwin, supra note 29, at 17.
298. Elizabeth A. Gerlach, Comment, The Background Check Balancing Act: Protecting
Applicants with Criminal Convictions While Encouraging Criminal Background Checks in
Hiring, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 981, 984 (2006) (noting that Title VII leaves ex-offenders
who are not members of a protected class without a remedy). Another limitation on Title VII
is that it applies only to employers with fifteen or more employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)
(2012).
299. See, e.g., Harwin, supra note 29, at 4–5; Simonson, supra note 46, at 284–85.
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American and Hispanic men with criminal records—women of all races
and Caucasian men will find it difficult to prove that criminal records
policies have a disparate impact on their groups.
Nonetheless, the fact that Title VII is not a panacea for ending
discrimination against those with criminal records is not a reason to
avoid its use in those instances in which it is legitimate and helpful. The
real risk is that too much success with Title VII could endanger other
reforms aimed at assisting in the re-integration of those with criminal
records generally.300 However, for reasons discussed later in this Article,
with appropriate caution and distribution of resources, that is unlikely to
be a problem.301 It is clear that Title VII is only a small part of the
solution. Limitations in disparate impact theory as a concept as well as
judicial acceptance of the theory in criminal records cases indicate that
other avenues of alleviating discrimination against those with criminal
records must be pursued.
D. Fairness to Employers
A final critique of using disparate impact theory to protect minority
men is that it is unfair to employers.302 This critique can be divided into
two threads: First, that individualized consideration of applicants with
criminal records will be too costly,303 and second, that employers may
risk liability for negligent hiring.304
While the possibility of liability for negligent hiring is a real concern,
it may not be so onerous as those who defend criminal records policies
claim.305 Such liability typically attaches when an employer fails to
discover that an employee has a particular type of criminal record that
should have put the employer on notice that other employees or its
customer base could be at risk.306 For example, in one case, a janitorial
contracting service was denied summary judgment on a negligent hiring
claim when it failed to discover a janitor’s prior record of assaulting a

300. See, e.g., Concepción, supra note 15, at 249–50.
301. See infra Part VI.B.
302. Morrisey et al., supra note 67, at 4–5.
303. Id.
304. See Monica Scales, Case Note, Employer Catch-22: The Paradox Between
Employer Liability for Employee Criminal Acts and the Prohibition Against Ex-Convict
Discrimination, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 419, 419, 423–24 (2002).
305. Connett, supra note 75, at 1062 (“[C]ritics have exaggerated the difficulty of
simultaneously avoiding disparate impact and negligent hiring liability.”).
306. See id.
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woman, and that employee assaulted a student at the university at which
the contracting service had placed him.307
However, the general principle that employers should not
indiscriminately bar those with criminal records from employment
would not be implicated in such situations. Of course an employer
should avoid hiring someone with a history of sexual assault in positions
that involve close, unsupervised contact with the very group the
employee has a history of assaulting. No one is arguing that child
molesters ought to have a fair chance at jobs in day cares or that those
with recent DUIs ought to be hired to drive a school bus. Individualized
consideration does not require ignoring obvious unsuitability for a job;
rather, it requires screening out only those who are obviously
unsuitable.308 For example, the applicant with a DUI might logically be
screened from the bus driver position, but it makes far less sense to
screen him out of the janitor position. Failure to screen the applicant
from the bus driving position might give rise to negligent hiring liability,
but liability would be extraordinarily unlikely in the latter case because,
assuming there are no driving duties associated with the janitorial
position, the possession of a prior DUI bears no cognizable relationship
to the job in question and an employer would not be reasonably
expected to foresee any potential harm arising from the prior
conviction.
Of course, whenever employer liability is implicated, a possible
result is over-caution on the part of the employer. It has been argued,
for example, that hostile environment sexual harassment liability leads
to over-restriction of speech in an attempt by the employer to avoid
liability.309 However, the over-caution suggested in allowing unchecked
use of criminal history in employment decisions is particularly nefarious.
It would be akin to allowing employers to avoid sexual harassment
liability by refusing to hire women. Such extreme measures cannot be
justified under Title VII because they perpetuate the very
discrimination that Title VII is aimed at preventing.310
307. Blair v. Defender Servs., Inc., 386 F.3d 623 (4th Cir. 2004).
308. Connett, supra note 75, at 1062 (“If an employer . . . carefully considers the
applicant’s prior offense and is unable to find a business necessity basis for denying the job, it
is unlikely that the hiring decision could be deemed negligent as the risk would not have been
reasonably foreseeable.”).
309. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, How Harassment Law Restricts Free Speech, 47
RUTGERS L. REV. 563, 567–69 (1995).
310. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)–(m) (2012). An employer could clearly not act in the
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Arguments have also been made that individualized consideration of
those with criminal backgrounds will be too costly for the employer.311
The underlying sentiment is that employers will be forced to interview
even those people whom they would never actually hire and whom they
would be justified in not hiring even under the more stringent
requirements.312 While this may be true in some instances, it is not
inevitable. Nothing in the EEOC’s guidelines or in Title VII law
generally requires employers to interview any more candidates than
they ordinarily would.313 Instead, if a given candidate is just as qualified
as or more qualified than another candidate but for his criminal record,
the employer would have a chance to assess that candidate as an
individual rather than screening him out up front. Under those
circumstances, it is actually beneficial to employers to avoid blind, broad
screens because they may discover that a given applicant who would
otherwise have been screened out is actually the best person for the job.
Furthermore, assuming that those with criminal records have less
education and job experience than those without criminal records,314 the
number of people with criminal records who would receive interviews
may increase only minimally.
VI. THE BOTTOM LINE:
THE PROMISE AND LIMITS OF DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY
Given the cases and policies that have been discussed throughout
this Article, the promise and limits of disparate impact theory can be
broken down into three distinct categories of cases: Those that will
likely win, those that will likely lose, and those that could win if
statistical evidence were improved. Understanding these distinctions is
important because there is little use in pursuing costly litigation in cases
that have virtually no chance of success. In such cases, money would be
better spent on other avenues of enforcement or policy change.
A. Cases That Will Likely Succeed
The EEOC has shown particular concern with broad-based

way described in the example in the sexual harassment case because such an act would be an
obvious example of disparate treatment on the basis of sex. See id.
311. Morrisey et al., supra note 67, at 4–5.
312. Id.
313. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; EEOC GUIDELINES, supra note 63.
314. See Holzer et al., supra note 5, at 4–5.
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exclusionary policies.315 Such policies are the most obviously unfair
because they deny virtually all individual consideration for potential
employees. Because of the strong underlying purpose of Title VII to
protect individuals from the stereotypes of grouping,316 cases involving
broad bans are very likely to succeed.
Particularly vulnerable to attack are broad bans barring employment
to those with only arrest records. Many legal authorities seem willing to
recognize that arrest records are qualitatively different from conviction
records because they do not indicate guilt.317 Broad bans without regard
to the type of crime committed are also vulnerable because they are
overinclusive, screening out people whose prior crime has little to
nothing to do with the job in question.318
Cases in these categories are very likely to succeed in most
circumstances.319 One exception is in jobs that entail an inherent
concern for public safety. In particular, police departments and fire
departments appear to be given carte blanche to discriminate based on
criminal backgrounds, even in cases in which the only mark on the
applicant is an arrest record.320 While safety is proffered as a business
necessity in many criminal records cases, courts seem particularly apt to
accept it with very little question in cases in which the job function, by
its very nature, is one of protection.321
B. Cases That Will Likely Fail
Cases that will likely lose fall into two main categories; the first of
those categories, jobs that involve public safety, has already been
discussed.322 The second category involves employers that already take

315. EEOC GUIDELINES, supra note 63.
316. See, e.g., supra note 274 and accompanying text.
317. Equal Opportunity Emp’t Comm’n, Enforcement Guidance: Consideration of
Arrest and Conviction Records in Employment Decisions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, in MASSACHUSETTS EMPLOYMENT LAW SOURCEBOOK & CITATOR 531, 549
n.101 (Laurence J. Donoghue, David G. Abbott & Paul H. Merry eds., 2013) (“At least 13
states have statutes explicitly prohibiting arrest record inquiries and/or dissemination subject
to certain exceptions.”); see also Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972);
supra Part IV.A.2.
318. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 806–07 (1973); Green
v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290, 1297–98 (8th Cir. 1975); see also supra Part IV.
319. See supra Part IV.A.
320. See supra Part IV.B.
321. See supra Part IV.B.
322. See supra Part IV.B.
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into account at least some of the Green factors as articulated by the
EEOC guidelines.323
As noted previously, the EEOC guidelines call for an individualized
assessment of candidates based on such factors as the type of crime in
question, the number of crimes committed, and the amount of time
passed since the crime was committed.324 Therefore, broad bans on
those with criminal records that are nonetheless time-limited and
tailored to the position in question are likely to survive.
For the most part, this is as it should be. As important as the goals
of re-integration and avoiding racial discrimination are, employers
ought not to be forced to turn a completely blind eye to criminal
histories that indicate unsuitability for particular positions. Thus,
employers ought not to be barred from excluding from financially
sensitive positions those with convictions for embezzlement.
More problematic are cases in which time limitations are accepted,
in and of themselves, as reasonable bars to employment. Such policies
might include situations such as broad bans on anyone who has been
convicted of any crime in, say, the past three years. The problem with
such policies is two-fold. First, such policies exacerbate recidivism
because most repeat offenders re-offend within the first few years of
release.325 If one of the causes of recidivism is a lack of employment
opportunities, then such people are likely to get caught in a cycle of
crime that may have been avoided if they had been able to secure
employment directly after their convictions.
Second, it is extremely difficult to ensure compliance with such rules.
Given the easy availability of criminal records that stretch far back into
the past,326 it seems unlikely that employers would turn a blind eye to
convictions that fall outside of the allowed time limit. Such policies rely
on a kind of honor code that employers will simply stop reading the
criminal record document once they get to a particular cut-off date.
While it is certainly possible to request information that goes back only
so far, it seems nearly impossible to prove, without inside information,
that an employer complied with such a requirement.

323.
324.
325.
326.

EEOC GUIDELINES, supra note 63, at 18.
Id. at 11, 18.
See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
See Holzer et al., supra note 5, at 9.
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C. The In-Between Cases
Cases that could go either way could turn into winning cases if more
refined statistics were employed.327 Such cases include those in which
bans are in place for only certain crimes and positions, and those where
the time utilized in looking backwards at the candidate’s record is not
sufficiently limited.328
Plaintiffs in these types of cases would be significantly more likely to
win with more sophisticated statistical analysis and the employment of
better expert witnesses.329 Courts will be more likely to decide in a
plaintiff’s favor if the statistics employed to show a disparity are more
closely tied to the labor force from which the employers’ candidates are
drawn.330 In other words, courts are less likely to respond well to
generalized statistics about the disproportionate number of minority
men with criminal records across the country. Instead, courts are
looking for more specific statistics about the population near the
employer and about how particular crimes, such as drug crimes, involve
disproportionate convictions amongst protected classes.331
Those that do respond to more general statistics tend to take
disparate impact as a given and focus instead on the business necessity
defense.332 In such cases, the best line of attack for plaintiffs will be to
provide expert witness testimony indicating the likelihood or lack
thereof that those who have previously perpetrated a given crime will do

327. See, e.g., EEOC v. Freeman, 961 F. Supp. 2d 783, 798–99 (D. Md. 2013). As
discussed supra Part IV.C.2, the court in Freeman was particularly disdainful of what it
deemed the poor quality of the statistical evidence offered. Freeman, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 798–
99.
328. Id. at 787–88; El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 236 (3d Cir. 2007).
329. See, e.g., El, 479 F.3d 232. As discussed supra Part IV.D, the court in SEPTA
relied heavily on the fact that the defendant had presented expert witnesses whose testimony
the plaintiff did not rebut. El, 479 F.3d at 246–47.
330. For example, a major concern of the court in EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers
Corp., 723 F. Supp. 734, 751 (S.D. Fla. 1989), was the fact that the statistics employed were
not targeted enough to the population surrounding the Fort Lauderdale plant to which the
plaintiff had applied or the population who had applied for the position. See also supra Part
IV.C.1.
331. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Berkowitz Oliver Williams Shaw & Eisenbrandt, LLP, 537 F.
Supp. 2d 1028 (W.D. Mo. 2008); see also supra note 179. In that case, the court noted that the
defendant presented only general crime statistics but no statistics indicating that minority
men would be disparately impacted by policies excluding those who have committed
particular crimes, in that case, sex offenses. Fletcher, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 1030.
332. See, e.g., Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290, 1297–99 (8th Cir. 1975);
Gregory, 316 F. Supp. 401; see also Harwin, supra note 29, at 6–7.
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so again, particularly on the job.333
Of course, such statistics and expert witnesses may not be readily
available.334 Without that information, cases in the in-between category
are far more likely to fall on the loss side of the spectrum. Knowing this,
a more efficient use of resources than immediately pursuing lawsuits
may be to invest in better social science research. Such data, while
costly to obtain up front, would not only increase the chances of winning
cases in the future, but might also influence some employers to refine
their own policies by causing them to re-examine their own biases.
D. A Final Word of Caution
While this Article ultimately argues that the use of disparate impact
theory in criminal-records-exclusion cases is both legitimate and, in
many cases, desirable, it would be unwise to end without noting two
further points of consideration that must be taken into account when
evaluating whether this path is the most appropriate or effective in
addressing the ultimate goal of minimizing the effects of criminal
records exclusions on the employment opportunities of minority men.
First, regardless of the legal merits of disparate impact theory, public
opinion regarding these types of cases ought not to be ignored.335 As
was noted previously, disparate impact theory, generally, has been
under attack for several years.336 Most recently, Justice Scalia called the
very constitutionality of the theory into question.337 Forty years on,

333. See supra note 329.
334. See supra notes 197–98 and accompanying text, noting that the court in EEOC v.
Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 723 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Fla. 1989), asked for applicant-flow
statistics in spite of acknowledging that they were unavailable. 723 F. Supp. at 742, 751.
335. Much of the public reaction to the new EEOC Guidelines has been negative. See,
e.g., James Bovard, Perform Criminal Background Checks at Your Peril, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15,
2013, at A15 (“Most businesses perform criminal background checks on job applicants, but
the EEOC guidance frowns on such checks and creates new legal tripwires that could spark
federal lawsuits.”); Peter Kirsanow & Carissa Mulder, The EEOC’s New Rule on Background
Checks, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Jan. 27, 2013, 7:56 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner
/338937/eeocs-new-rule-background-checks-peter-kirsanow, archived at http://perma.cc/9QG
U-GB5B (“Despite the profound effect the guidance has on the nation’s employers, the
EEOC hurriedly implemented the guidance without giving the public an adequate
opportunity to comment on it.”). But see Editorial, A Second Chance for Ex-Offenders, N.Y.
TIMES, June 20, 2013, at A26.
336. See supra note 74.
337. Ricci v. DeStefano 557 U.S. 557, 595–96 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he war
between disparate impact and equal protection will be waged sooner or later, and it behooves
us to begin thinking about how—and on what terms—to make peace between them.”).
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commentators have begun to doubt whether disparate impact theory is
still needed and whether it is a valid expression of the purposes of Title
VII now that at least some of the historical discrimination that seemed
to be its driving force has been alleviated. The fact of the matter is that
those with criminal records do not present a sympathetic class. As the
rapid and scathing backlash against the EEOC’s release of its new
enforcement guidelines shows,338 too much attention in this area could
risk undermining the theory of disparate impact as a whole.
Second, in spite of the promise of using disparate impact theory in
criminal-records-exclusion cases, it remains a somewhat awkward fit,
with far too many opportunities for individuals to fall through the
cracks. While federal law remains inadequate to the task of providing
broader employment protections to those with criminal records, it may
make more sense to focus reform efforts at the state and local levels
where there has been much more progress.339 Stronger and more
pervasive state laws would likely offer more protection, and more
quickly, while having the side effect of bolstering support for broader
federal reforms by providing incubators to test out new policies and
laws.
Nonetheless, in spite of these words of caution, a more concerted
effort to enforce Title VII against those criminal records policies to
which it applies is a welcome goal. So long as resources are focused on
those cases with higher chances of winning, greater enforcement should
ultimately strengthen and increase the impact of Title VII.

338. See supra notes 67, 335.
339. See Concepción, supra note 15, at 249–50 & nn.146–55.

